“The fierceness of the Hungarian resistance was not inferior to the German one. Hungary during the Second World War Magyars in WWII


When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Hungary decided to take full part in the hostilities.

After a northern Hungarian town was bombed from the air by an unknown aircraft on June 27, Hungary terminated diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and declared war on it. The Hungarian army leadership expected a quick victory for Germany. At the end of June, Hungarian units were sent to the Eastern Front. Some of them advanced deep into Soviet territory together with German strike forces, while others ensured security in the rear of German troops.

Subsequently, to its chagrin, Hungary found itself at war with Great Britain and the United States. The United States declared war on Hungary on June 5, 1942. In January 1942, under strong German pressure, Bardossy promised to send additional troops to the Eastern Front. On March 9, 1942, primarily due to Germany's failure to quickly defeat the Soviet Union, Horthy dismissed Bardossy. He appoints Miklós Kállai as Prime Minister, who continues his policy of openly supporting Germany while holding secret negotiations with Anglo-Saxon forces in the hope of getting Hungary out of the war. Meanwhile, from April to June 1942, the 2nd Hungarian Army, consisting of more than 200 thousand people, was sent to the Eastern Front to strengthen the German group.

The Hungarian forces in the Soviet Union were insufficiently armed, and the available weapons were outdated, and poorly organized supplies led to a shortage of ammunition. The catastrophic defeat of the 2nd Hungarian Army in the Voronezh region during the winter of 1943 resulted in more than 120 thousand casualties alone, and was perceived in Hungary as a national tragedy. Captured Hungarian soldiers After such a blow, Kállai, more convinced than ever, tried to take Hungary out of the war. His secret diplomatic activities intensified, and his participation in military operations was sharply limited. This infuriated Hitler, who wanted full Hungarian participation in the war. Hitler was also upset by the Hungarian government's secret negotiations with the Western allies aimed at getting Hungary out of the war. He was well informed about these negotiations from pro-German sources in the Budapest government.

Alarmed by the Hungarian government's attempts to withdraw from the war, on March 19, 1944, Hitler sent German troops to occupy Hungary and force it to continue participating in the war on the German side. Under German pressure, Horthy was forced to appoint Dyome Stojai, the former Hungarian ambassador to Berlin known for his pro-German sentiments, as prime minister. Anti-fascist parties were banned, and politicians hostile to Germany were arrested. The Hungarian government was also forced to send additional forces to the Eastern Front to fight the Red Army. But the occupation also led to a weakening of Hungary's economic importance for the Reich, due to the significant costs of maintaining troops, mass arrests and deportations of Jews, and increased Allied bombing. In an attempt to weaken German influence, on August 29, 1944, Horthy appointed a new prime minister, Géz Lakatos, who ordered units of the Hungarian army to conduct an offensive operation in southern Transylvania to delay the Soviet-Romanian invasion.

Realizing that the end of the war was near, Horthy sent a delegation to Moscow to negotiate an armistice with the Soviet Union, which was signed on October 11, 1944. On October 15, 1944, Horthy announced on the radio the unconditional surrender of Hungary. But due to a lack of coordination with the Hungarian Army Chief of Staff János Voros, the army continued to fight and Horthy's attempt to surrender failed. German units entered Budapest and forced Horthy to cede power to Ferenc Szálasi, leader of the fascist pro-German Arrow Cross party. Horthy was arrested by the Gestapo and taken to Germany with his family.

During Szalasi's short reign, a reign of terror was established in Hungary. Thousands of people, including many Jews who took refuge in Budapest, were arrested and executed or sent to concentration camps. Meanwhile, the Soviet army continued to advance, and in December 1944 besieged Budapest. Two and a half months later, the remnants of the German forces in Buda surrendered, and on January 20, 1945, in Moscow, representatives of the Hungarian government signed an armistice. Most of the hostilities in the country ended in February 1945, but the last German units were driven off Hungarian soil only in April 1945. The country got rid of German military control and came under Soviet control.

Those who like to rewrite history should familiarize themselves with the dry numbers of a brief description of the Hungarian army and its actions in the Second World War. Which, almost in full force, fought with the anti-Hitler coalition until the last day.

The main goal of Hungarian foreign policy was the return of territories lost after the First World War. In 1939, Hungary began reforming its Armed Forces (“Honvédség”). The brigades were deployed into army corps, a mechanized corps and an air force were created, prohibited by the Treaty of Trianon in 1920.

In August 1940, in accordance with the decision of the Vienna Arbitration, Romania returned Northern Transylvania to Hungary. The eastern Hungarian border passed along a strategically important line - the Carpathians. Hungary concentrated the 9th (“Carpathian”) Corps on it.

On April 11, 1941, Hungarian troops occupied a number of areas of northern Yugoslavia. Thus, Hungary returned part of its lost in 1918 - 1920. territories, but became completely dependent on German support. The Hungarian army encountered almost no resistance from Yugoslav troops (except for the April 8 Yugoslav air raid on German military bases in Hungary) and occupied the main city of the Yugoslav left bank of the Danube, Novi Sad, where mass pogroms took place against Jews.

By mid-1941, the Hungarian armed forces numbered 216 thousand people. They were led by the head of state with the help of the Supreme Military Council, the General Staff and the War Ministry.

Military parade in Budapest.

The ground forces had three field armies of three army corps each (the country was divided into nine districts according to the areas of responsibility of the army corps) and a separate mobile corps. The army corps consisted of three infantry brigades (Dandar), a cavalry squadron, a mechanized howitzer battery, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, a flight of reconnaissance aircraft, an engineer battalion, a communications battalion and logistics units.

The infantry brigade, created on the model of the Italian two-regimental division, in peacetime consisted of one infantry regiment of the first stage and one reserve infantry regiment (both three-battalion strength), two field artillery divisions (24 guns), a cavalry detachment, air defense companies and communications, 139 light and heavy machine guns. Regimental platoons and heavy weapons companies each had 38 anti-tank rifles and 40 anti-tank guns (mainly 37 mm caliber).

Standard infantry armament consisted of a modernized 8 mm Mannlicher rifle and Solothurn and Schwarzlose machine guns. In 1943, during the unification of the weapons of Germany's allies, the caliber was changed to the standard German 7.92 mm. During the course of the war, 37 mm German-made and 47 mm Belgian-made anti-tank guns gave way to heavier German guns. The artillery used Czech-made mountain and field guns of the Skoda system, howitzers of the Skoda, Beaufort and Rheinmetall systems.

The mechanized corps consisted of Italian CV 3/35 wedges, Hungarian armored vehicles of the Csaba system and light tanks of the Toldi system.

Each corps had an infantry battalion equipped with trucks (in practice, a bicycle battalion), as well as anti-aircraft and engineering battalions, and a communications battalion.

In addition, the Hungarian Armed Forces included two mountain brigades and 11 border brigades; numerous labor battalions (formed, as a rule, from representatives of national minorities); small units of the Life Guards, Royal Guards and Parliamentary Guards in the capital of the country - Budapest.

By the summer of 1941, the battalions were approximately 50% equipped with tanks.

In total, the Hungarian ground forces consisted of 27 infantry (mostly framed) brigades, as well as two motorized brigades, two border jäger brigades, two cavalry brigades, and one mountain rifle brigade.

The Hungarian Air Force consisted of five aviation regiments, one long-range reconnaissance division and one parachute battalion. The Hungarian Air Force's aircraft fleet consisted of 536 aircraft, of which 363 were combat aircraft.

1st stage of the war against the USSR

On June 26, 1941, unidentified aircraft raided the Hungarian city of Kassa (now Kosice in Slovakia). Hungary declared these planes to be Soviet. There is currently an opinion that this raid was a German provocation.

On June 27, 1941, Hungary declared war on the USSR. The so-called “Carpathian Group” was deployed to the Eastern Front:

First Mountain Infantry Brigade;
- eighth border brigade;
- mechanized corps (without a second cavalry brigade).

These forces invaded the Ukrainian Carpathian region on July 1 and, after starting battles with the Soviet 12th Army, crossed the Dniester. Hungarian troops occupied Kolomyia. Then the mechanized corps (40 thousand people) entered the territory of Right Bank Ukraine and continued military operations as part of the 17th German Army. In the Uman region, as a result of joint actions with German troops, 20 Soviet divisions were captured or destroyed.

Hungarian soldier with an anti-tank rifle. Eastern front.

In October 1941, the corps, after a rapid 950-kilometer throw, reached Donetsk, having lost 80% of its equipment. In November, the corps was recalled to Hungary, where it was disbanded.

From October 1941, the first mountain rifle and eighth border brigades in the Ukrainian Carpathian region were replaced by newly formed security forces brigades numbered 102, 105, 108, 121 and 124. These brigades each included two reserve infantry regiments armed with light weapons, an artillery battery and a squadron cavalry (6 thousand people in total).

In February 1942, the Germans moved the 108th Security Forces Brigade to the front line in the Kharkov area, where it suffered significant losses.

2nd stage of the war against the USSR

In the spring of 1942, Germany's need for more soldiers on the Soviet-German front forced the Hungarians to mobilize their second army of 200,000 men. It included:

3rd Corps: 6th Brigade (22nd, 52nd Infantry Regiments), 7th Brigade (4th, 35th Infantry Regiments), 9th Brigade (17th, 47th Infantry Regiments) shelves);

4th Corps: 10th Brigade (6th, 36th Infantry Regiments), 12th Brigade (18th, 48th Infantry Regiments), 13th Brigade (7th, 37th Infantry Regiments) shelves); 7th Corps: 19th Brigade (13th, 43rd Infantry Regiments), 20th Brigade (14th, 23rd Infantry Regiments), 23rd Brigade (21st, 51st Infantry Regiments) shelves).

In addition, subordinate to the army headquarters were: 1st armored brigade (30th tank and 1st motorized infantry regiments, 1st reconnaissance and 51st anti-tank battalions), 101st heavy artillery division, 150th motorized artillery division, 101st motorized anti-aircraft division and 151st engineer battalion.

Each brigade had an artillery regiment and support units, the number of which was identical to the brigade number. After October 1942, a reconnaissance battalion was added to each of the brigades, formed from the newly created mobile units (which combined cavalry, motorized rifle, cyclists and armored units). The armored brigade was formed in the spring of 1942 from two existing mechanized brigades and was equipped with tanks 38(t) (formerly Czechoslovak LT-38), T-III and T-IV, as well as Hungarian Toldi light tanks, Csaba armored personnel carriers ( Csaba) and self-propelled guns "Nimrod" (Nimrod).

Germany proposed rewarding Hungarian soldiers who distinguished themselves on the Eastern Front with large land plots in Russia.

Under the command of Colonel General Gustav Jani, the Second Army arrived in the Kursk region in June 1942 and advanced to forward positions along the Don south of Voronezh. She was supposed to defend this direction in case of a possible counter-offensive by Soviet troops. From August to December 1942, the Hungarian army fought long, exhausting battles with Soviet troops in the area of ​​Uryv and Korotoyak (near Voronezh). The Hungarians failed to liquidate the Soviet bridgehead on the right bank of the Don and develop an offensive towards Serafimovichi. At the end of December 1942, the Hungarian Second Army switched to passive defense.

During this period, the territory of Hungary began to be subject to air raids. On September 5 and 10, Soviet long-range aviation carried out strikes on Budapest.

Hungarian troops in the Don steppes. Summer 1942

At the beginning of the winter of 1942, the Hungarian command repeatedly turned to the German command with a request to provide the Hungarian troops with modern anti-tank guns - the shells of outdated 20-mm and 37-mm guns did not penetrate the armor of Soviet T-34 tanks.

On January 12, 1943, Soviet troops crossed the Don River across the ice and broke through the defenses at the junction of the 7th and 12th brigades. The 1st Armored Brigade, which was subordinate to the German command, was withdrawn and did not receive the order to counterattack the enemy. The disorderly retreat of the Hungarian army was covered by units of the 3rd Corps. The losses of the 2nd Army amounted to about 30 thousand soldiers and officers killed, and the army lost almost all tanks and heavy weapons. Among the fallen was the eldest son of the Kingdom's regent, Miklos Horthy. The remaining 50 thousand soldiers and officers were taken prisoner. This was the largest defeat of the Hungarian army in the entire history of its existence.

Hungarian soldiers who died at Stalingrad. Winter 1942 - 1943

3rd stage of the war against the USSR

In March 1943, Admiral Horthy, seeking to strengthen troops within the country, recalled the Second Army back to Hungary. Most of the army's reserve regiments were transferred to the "Dead Army", which turned out to be the only association of Hungarian troops that actively fought on the Soviet-German front. Its military formations were reorganized and given new numbers, although this process was more likely aimed at the German ally than at the Russians. Now the Hungarian army included the 8th Corps stationed in Belarus (5th, 9th, 12th and 23rd brigades) and the 7th Corps remaining in Ukraine (1st, 18th, 19th I, 21st and 201st brigades).

This army first of all had to fight the partisans. In 1943, artillery and reconnaissance units were deployed into battalions. These Hungarian units were subsequently united into the 8th Corps (soon to become known in their homeland as the "Dead Army"). The corps was formed in Kyiv, and was tasked with protecting communications from Polish, Soviet and Ukrainian partisans in northeastern Ukraine and the Bryansk forests.

In mid-1943, the Hungarians decided to reorganize their infantry brigades along German lines: three infantry regiments, 3-4 artillery divisions, as well as engineering and reconnaissance battalions. The regular infantry regiments of each corps were united into “mixed divisions”, the reserve regiments into “reserve divisions”; All mechanized units were reassigned to the first corps; its basis was the recreated 1st armored division, the newly formed 2nd armored division and the 1st cavalry division, formed in 1942 from the previous cavalry brigades.

The Border Guard Group of the 27th Light Division operated as a third regiment throughout the 1944 campaign. The mountain and border battalions were not reorganized, but were reinforced in Transylvania by 27 Szekler militia battalions. A shortage of weapons seriously delayed this reorganization, but eight mixed divisions were ready by the end of 1943, and reserve divisions by the spring of 1944. Most of them were transferred to the “Dead Army”, which the German command refused to send to Hungary and which now consisted from the 2nd Reserve Corps (former 8th, 5th, 9th, 12th and 23rd Reserve Divisions) and the 7th Corps (18th and 19th Reserve Divisions).

Armored divisions were stationed at the forefront of the Soviet-German front. The tank battalions were equipped with Hungarian medium tanks Turan I and II. The combat readiness of the crews after several years of war was at a high level.

In addition, they added eight assault gun divisions. At first it was supposed to equip them with new assault guns of the Zrinyi system, but there were only enough guns for two battalions, the rest were armed with 50 German StuG III. Initially the divisions were numbered 1 to 8, but later they were assigned the numbers of the corresponding mixed divisions to which they were supposed to be attached.

4th stage of the war against the USSR

In March - April 1944, German troops entered Hungarian territory to guarantee its continued loyalty. The Hungarian army was ordered not to resist.

After this, mobilization was completely carried out for the first time. In May 1944, the 1st Army (2nd Armored, 7th, 16th, 20th, 24th and 25th Mixed and 27th Light Divisions, 1st and 2nd Mountain Infantry brigade) was sent to the Ukrainian Carpathian region. She was also given the 7th Corps of the “Dead Army”, which was already conducting combat operations in this direction.

The 1st Hungarian Tank Division attempted to counterattack the Soviet tank corps near Kolomyia - this attempt ended in the death of 38 Turan tanks and the rapid withdrawal of the Hungarian 2nd Armored Division to the state border.

By August 1944, the army was reinforced with the remaining regular divisions (6th, 10th and 13th mixed). However, the army soon had to retreat to the Hunyadi line in the north of the Carpathian section of the border, where it took up defensive positions. Meanwhile, the elite 1st Cavalry Division linked up with the 2nd Reserve Corps in the Pripyat area. The division distinguished itself during the retreat to Warsaw and was awarded the right to be called the 1st Hussar Division. Soon after this the entire corps was repatriated.

Romania's defection to the USSR in August 1944 exposed Hungary's southern borders. On September 4, the Hungarian government declared war on Romania. To obtain new formations, training units of infantry, armored, cavalry divisions and mountain brigades were combined into depot divisions or “Scythian” divisions. Despite the pompous name "division", they usually consisted of no more than a couple of battalions and batteries of artillery and soon, together with some formations from the 1st Army, were transferred to the 2nd Army (2nd Armored, 25th Combined, 27th Light, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th and 9th “Scythian” divisions; 1st and 2nd Mountain Infantry Brigades, units of the Zeckler militia), which quickly moved into Eastern Transylvania. .

The newly created 3rd Army (1st armored, “Scythian” cavalry, 20th mixed, 23rd reserve, 4th, 5th and 8th “Scythian” divisions) was transferred to Western Transylvania. She had to stop the Romanian and Soviet troops who began crossing the South Carpathian passes. The 3rd Army managed to create a defensive line along the Hungarian-Romanian border. In the Arad area, the 7th Assault Artillery Division destroyed 67 Soviet T-34 tanks.

The Soviet command tried to convince the commander of the 1st Army, Colonel General Belo Miklos von Dalnoky, to oppose the Germans, but he eventually decided to retreat to the west. Finding itself in a hopeless situation, the 2nd Army also retreated.

On September 23, 1944, Soviet troops entered Hungarian territory in the Battonyi area. On October 14, 1944, a Soviet ultimatum to Hungary followed with a demand to declare a truce within 48 hours, break all relations with Germany, begin active military operations against German troops, and also begin the withdrawal of its troops from the pre-war territory of Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

On October 15, 1944, M. Horthy accepted the terms of the ultimatum, but the Hungarian troops did not stop fighting. The Germans immediately arrested him and installed the leader of the ultranationalist Arrow Cross party, Ferenc Szálasi, at the head of the country, vowing to continue the war to a victorious end. The Hungarian army came more and more under the control of German generals. The corps structure of the army was destroyed, and the three active armies were reinforced by German military units.

Otto Skorzeny (1st from right) in Budapest after the completion of Operation Faustpatron. October 20, 1944

The German command agreed to the creation of several Hungarian SS infantry divisions: the 22nd SS Maria Theresa Volunteer Division, the 25th Hunyadi, the 26th Gombos and two others (which never were formed). During the Second World War, Hungary gave the largest number of volunteers to the SS troops. In March 1945, the XVII SS Army Corps was created, called “Hungarian”, since it included the majority of the Hungarian SS formations. The last battle (with American troops) of the corps took place on May 3, 1945.

Propaganda poster “Against all odds!”

In addition, the Germans decided to equip four new Hungarian divisions with modern weapons: Kossuth, Görgey, Petöfi and Klapka, from which only Kossuth was formed. The most effective new military formation turned out to be the elite parachute division “St. Laszlo” (Szent Laszlo), created on the basis of the parachute battalion.

The composition of the formed divisions was as follows:

"Kossuth": 101st, 102nd, 103rd infantry, 101st artillery regiments.

“Saint Laszlo”: 1st parachute battalion, 1st, 2nd elite infantry regiments, 1st, 2nd armored regiments, 1st, 2nd reconnaissance battalions, two river guard battalions, anti-aircraft division.

Modern German tanks and self-propelled artillery units were transferred to the Hungarian armored forces: 13 Tigers, 5 Panthers, 74 T-IVs and 75 Hetzer tank destroyers.

5th stage of the war against the USSR

On November 4, 1944, Soviet troops approached Budapest, but already on November 11, their offensive was bogged down as a result of fierce resistance from German and Hungarian troops.

At the end of December 1944, the Hungarian 1st Army retreated to Slovakia, the 2nd Army was disbanded and its units were transferred to the 3rd Army, stationed south of Lake Balaton, and the German 6th and 8th armies. occupying positions in Northern Hungary.

On December 26, Soviet troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts completed the encirclement of the Budapest group of German and Hungarian troops. Budapest was cut off, it was defended by a mixed German-Hungarian garrison, which consisted of the 1st Armored, 10th Mixed and 12th Reserve Divisions, the Bilnitzer assault artillery group (1st Armored Car, 6th, 8th , 9th and 10th Artillery Assault Battalions), anti-aircraft units and Iron Guard volunteers.

From January 2 to January 26, 1945, counterattacks by German and Hungarian troops followed, trying to relieve the encircled group in Budapest. In particular, on January 18, Hungarian troops launched an offensive between lakes Balaton and Velence and on January 22 occupied the city of Szekesfehervár.

On February 13, 1945, Budapest capitulated. Meanwhile, the bloodless 1st Army retreated to Moravia, where it occupied a defensive line that lasted until the end of the war.

On March 6, 1945, Hungarian and German troops launched an offensive in the area of ​​Lake Balaton, but on March 15, Soviet troops stopped it.

In mid-March 1945, after the failure of the German counteroffensive in the area of ​​Lake Balaton, the remnants of the 3rd Army turned west, and the 1st Hussar Division was destroyed near Budapest. By March 25, most of the remnants of the Hungarian 3rd Army were destroyed 50 kilometers west of Budapest. The remnants of the 2nd Armored, 27th Light, 9th and 23rd Reserve Divisions, as well as the 7th and 8th "Scythian" divisions surrendered to the Americans in Northern Austria, while the remaining units (including the " St. Laszlo") fought on the Austrian-Yugoslav border and only surrendered to British troops in May 1945.

During the battles for Budapest in the winter of 1945, Hungarian formations appeared as part of the Soviet army.

During the Second World War, Hungary lost about 300 thousand military personnel killed, and 513,766 people were captured.

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Now times have changed, but not much. Not so long ago,

On April 21, 2011, the Hungarian news channel N1, broadcasting on the Internet, released a story on April 20 congratulating Adolf Hitler on his birthday.

We know that Hungarians are true to themselves in their passions and orientations. And don't buildm illusions.

We remember well that the Hungarians were Hitler's most loyal allies. We also remember not about the atrocities of the Hungarians against the Russians, for animals do not behave like that, but about the sadistic cruelties that only non-humans can afford. And these nonhumans were the Hungarians in Russia.

The Hungarians must remember that it was not we who came to them with weapons, but they who came to us.

The Hungarians, like soldiers in Adolf Hitler's army, killed our citizens. Moreover, their cruelty and sadism exceeded the actions of the Wehrmacht, SS and Gestapo. Old-timers of Voronezh remember this very well.

During the Soviet era, it was not customary to talk about Hungarian sadism in the name of “friendship of peoples.”
But Hungarians should know that we remember this too. We remember. We remember it very well.

But for some reason the Russians even created a cemetery for these nonhumans.

If it were up to me, I would have acted in a civilized way - in the German way: I would have poured bleach on their remains. Like all the Germans with the Japanese, Romanians and especially the Ov (their divisions were stationed at Borodino with the Germans in 1941).

This is exactly what the Germans would have done to the Russians if they had been able to win the Second World War.

But Russians are just idiots. They think. that Europeans have changed for the better over the last 500 years.

Their criterion is always the same - benefit and profit at any cost.

About the crimes of the Hungarian troops on the territory of the USSR

June 9th, 2010

In 1941, Hungarian troops, together with the Nazi Wehrmacht, invaded the territory of our country. Hungarian soldiers fought not only at the front - they took part in numerous punitive operations in Russia and Belarus. Unfortunately, this topic has received virtually no research; however, in the archives there are numerous testimonies about the atrocities of the Hungarians. Here are some of them - handwritten testimonies of peasants living in the Sevsk region.

“Fascist accomplices of the Magyars entered our village Svetlovo 9/V-42,” said peasant Anton Ivanovich Krutukhin. - All the residents of our village hid from such a pack, and they, as a sign that the residents began to hide from them, and those who could not hide, neither shot them, raped several of our women. I myself, an old man born in 1875, was also forced to hide in the cellar... There was shooting all over the village, buildings were burning, and Magyar soldiers were robbing our things, stealing cows and calves” (GARF. F. R-7021. Op. 37. D. 423. L. 561-561ob).

In the nearby village of Orliya Slobodka, at that time all the residents were gathered in the square. “The Magyars arrived and began to gather us into one (nrzb) and drove us out to the village. Korostovka, where we spent the night in the church - women, and men separately at school - recalled Vasilisa Fedotkina. - In the afternoon of 17/V-42, we were driven back to our village of Orlia, where we spent the night and for tomorrow, i.e. On 18/V-42 we were again gathered in a heap near the church where we were re-sorted - the women were driven to the village. Orlia Slobodka, and left the men with them” (Ibid. L. 567).

On May 20, about 700 Hungarian soldiers headed from Orlia to nearby villages. On the collective farm “4th Bolshevik Sev” they arrested all the men. “When they saw the men of our village, they said that they were partisans,” said Varvara Fedorovna Mazerkova. – And the same number, i.e. 20/V-42 seized my husband Mazekov Sidor Bor[isovich], born in 1862, and my son Mazekov Alexei Sidorovich, born in 1927 and tortured them, and after this torture they tied their hands and threw them into a pit, then they lit straw and burned them in potato pit. On the same day they not only burned my husband and son, they also burned 67 men” (Ibid. L. 543-543ob).

After this, the Magyars moved to the village of Svetlovo. The villagers remembered the pogrom carried out by punitive forces some ten days ago. “When my family and I noticed a moving convoy, all of us residents of our village fled into the Khinelsky forest,” recalled Zakhar Stepanovich Kalugin. However, there were murders here too: the old people remaining in the village were shot by the Hungarians (Ibid. L. 564).

The punitive forces pacified the surrounding villages for a whole week. Residents fled into the forest, but they were found there too. “It was in May on the 28th day of the year 42,” said resident of Orlia Slobodka Evdokia Vedeshina. - I and almost all the residents went into the forest. These thugs also followed there. They are in our place, where we (nrzb) with our people shot and tortured 350 people, including my children who were tortured, daughter Nina 11 years old, Tonya 8 years old, little son Vitya 1 year old and son Kolya 5 years old. I remained barely alive under the corpses of my children” (Ibid. L. 488-488ob).

Abandoned by villagers, the villages were burned out. “When we returned from the forest to the village, the village was unrecognizable,” recalled Natalya Aldushina, a resident of the long-suffering Svetlov. - Several old men, women and children were brutally killed by the Nazis. Houses were burned, large and small livestock were stolen. The holes in which our things were buried were dug up. There was nothing left in the village except black bricks. The women who remained in the village talked about the atrocities of the fascists” (Ibid. L. 517).

Thus, in just three Russian villages, at least 420 civilians were killed by the Hungarians in 20 days. It is possible that there were more deaths - we do not have complete data on this matter. But we know that these cases were not isolated.

Thus, in 1943, during the retreat from the Chernyansky district of the Kursk region, “German-Magyar military units took with them 200 prisoners of war from the Red Army and 160 Soviet patriots held in a concentration camp. Along the way, the fascist barbarians locked all these 360 ​​people in a school building, doused them with gasoline and set them on fire. Those who tried to escape were shot” (“Fiery Arc”: The Battle of Kursk through the eyes of Lubyanka. M., 2003. P. 248).

And here is how the Hungarians treated Soviet prisoners of war: “On July 12-15, 1942, on the Kharkeevka farm in the Shatalovsky district of the Kursk region, soldiers of the 33rd Hungarian Infantry Division captured four Red Army soldiers. One of them, senior lieutenant P.V. Danilov's eyes were gouged out, his jaw was knocked to the side with the butt of a rifle, he was given 12 bayonet blows to the back, after which he was buried half-dead in the ground in an unconscious state. Three Red Army soldiers, whose names are unknown, were shot (Schneer A. Captivity: Soviet prisoners of war in Germany, 1941 - 1945. M., 2005. P. 232. With reference to the Yad Vashem archive. M-33/497. L. 53).

On January 5, 1943, a resident of the city of Ostogozhsk, Maria Kaydannikova, saw how Hungarian soldiers drove a group of prisoners into the basement of a store on the street. Medvedovsky. Soon screams were heard from there. A monstrous scene appeared to the eyes of Kaydannikova, who looked through the window: “There was a fire burning brightly there. Two Magyars held the prisoner by the shoulders and legs and slowly roasted his stomach and legs over the fire. They either raised him above the fire, or lowered him lower, and when he fell silent, the Magyars threw his body face down on the fire. Suddenly the prisoner twitched again. Then one of the Magyars thrust a bayonet into his back with a flourish” (Ibid. With reference to the Yad Vashem archive. M-33/494. L. 14).

The history of relations between Russia and then the Soviet Union with Hungary has enough “blank spots”. One of them is the fate of Hungarian prisoners of war in the USSR in 1941 - 1955. This article was written as a result of many years of fundamental research into the history of the detention of foreign prisoners of war on the territory of the Soviet Union in the period 1941 -1956, the factual basis of which was made up of documents from the central state archives of the USSR, including captured documents.

The criminal policy of the leaders of Hitler's Germany was the cause of the tragedy not only of the German people, but also of the peoples of the satellite countries. The people of Hungary, who were drawn into the war against the USSR, also became hostages of Hitler’s political adventure. However, the historical past of the Soviet Union and Hungary had no basis for enmity and hatred between the peoples of these countries. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of the population of Hungary, including the personnel of the Hungarian army, was not interested in a war with the Soviet people, did not believe in the need for a war with the USSR, especially for the interests of Nazi Germany. According to the first post-war Prime Minister of Hungary, his country fought on the side of Germany because before the war the Germans created a fifth column. Of course, this statement is not without foundation.

About a million Swabian Germans lived in pre-war Hungary, making up a wealthy and privileged part of the population. In percentage terms, Hungarian Germans accounted for 6.2% of the country's total population on June 30, 1941. Many Hungarian army officers were of German origin. Some changed their surnames to Hungarian or modeled after Hungarian ones. Naturally, the Nazi government made maximum use of the capabilities of the Hungarian Germans and Hungarian fascists to involve Hungary in the war with the Soviet Union.

The accession of Hungary on November 20, 1940 to the tripartite pact Germany - Italy - Japan placed it in the category of direct opponents of the USSR and significantly influenced the nature of the relationship between the USSR and Hungary.

In view of this, the Hungarian government significantly increased its armed forces, which by the end of 1940 amounted to about one million people. The population of the country and the personnel of its armed forces began to prepare for war. At the same time, people began to form an attitude towards captivity. As a result of massive propaganda work in the army, it was possible to create a persistent fear of Soviet captivity among soldiers and officers. This mood lasted almost until the end of 1944. Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of Hungarian prisoners of war at the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942 stated that if they had known about the friendly attitude towards prisoners, they would have surrendered immediately upon arrival at the front. As events developed during the Second World War, by the beginning of 1944, anti-war and anti-German sentiments became widespread in the Hungarian army and among the Hungarian population (according to sociological studies), and interest in our country began to increase. In particular, professor of the Lyceum in Ayud, Professor Zibar, expressing surprise at the high culture of Soviet officers, said: “... we were not sufficiently informed about Russia, and the whole of Central Europe did not understand Russia well.”

Having entered the war with the Soviet Union, the Hungarian government initially sent selected troops, although not numerous, to the front. The number of Hungarian soldiers and officers who participated in hostilities against the USSR in the period from June 27, 1941 to 1943 is shown in Table 1.

The number of Hungarian prisoners of war grew accordingly (see table 2).

It should be noted that on June 30, 1941, of the total population of Hungary (16 million 808 thousand 837 people), i.e. 100%, were: Hungarians (Magyars) - 82%, Germans - 6.2%, Ukrainians - 4 .6%., Slovenians - 3.9%, Jews - about 3%, Romanians and other nationalities - 2.3%. To some extent, this determined the national composition of prisoners of war from this army.

Hungarian prisoners of war, 1942-1943.

The official accounting documents of the USSR NKVD Directorate for Prisoners of War and Internees (UPVI NKVD USSR), which was directly and solely responsible to the Soviet government for the maintenance and accounting of prisoners of war, do not have the required clarity. For example, in some accounting documents all Hungarian prisoners of war are listed as “Hungarians”, in others as “Magyars”, and in others - “prisoners of war of the Hungarian army” or “Germans of Hungarian citizenship”, etc. Therefore, it was not possible to make an accurate count based on ethnicity. The problem was only partially solved.

An analysis of documentary materials for the 1st quarter of 1944 showed that on March 1, 1944, there were 28,706 prisoners of war of the Hungarian army (2 generals, 413 officers, 28,291 non-commissioned officers and privates) in captivity in the USSR. Of this number of prisoners of war, 14,853 people are included in the “Hungarians” column (2 generals, 359 officers, 14,492 non-commissioned officers and privates). What nationality the remaining 13,853 prisoners of war were remains unclear. In addition, there are arithmetic errors and typos in official documents. All this required not only a recalculation of the already collected data, but also a comparison with materials from other archives and departments.

It was possible to establish the national composition of prisoners of war of the Hungarian army in the Soviet Union on January 1, 1948. At that time, 112,955 people were held captive. Of these, by nationality:

a) Hungarians - 111,157, and only 96,551 people were Hungarian citizens; the rest had citizenship of Romania (9,286 people), Czechoslovakia (2,912), Yugoslavia (1,301), Germany (198), USSR (69), Poland (40), Austria (27), Belgium (2), Bulgaria (1 Human);

b) Germans - 1,806;

c) Jews - 586;

d) gypsies - 115;

e) Czechs and Slovaks - 58;

f) Austrians - 15;

g) Serbs and Croats - 5;

h) Moldovans - 5;

i) Russians - 3;

j) Poles - 1;

k) Ukrainians - 1;

m) Turk - 1.

All prisoners of war of the listed nationalities had Hungarian citizenship. From official sources it is clear that from June 27, 1941 to June 1945, 526,604 military personnel and equivalent Hungarian citizens were captured. Of these, as of January 1, 1949, 518,583 people had left. Those who left were distributed as follows: repatriated - 418,782 people; transferred to the formation of Hungarian national military units - 21,765 people, transferred to the register of internees - 13,100; released from captivity as citizens of the USSR and sent to their place of residence - 2,922 people; men captured during the liberation of Budapest were released - 10,352; transferred to the Gulag camps of the NKVD of the USSR - 14 people; convicted by military tribunals - 70; sent to prison - 510; escaped from captivity and was caught - 8; other departures - 55; died from various causes - 51,005; were registered as prisoners of war and kept in prisoner of war camps on January 1, 1949 - 8,021 people.

On October 1, 1955, the total number of prisoners of war of the Hungarian army in the USSR was 513,767 people (49 generals, 15,969 officers, 497,749 non-commissioned officers and privates). Of these, from June 1941 to November 1955, 459,014 people were repatriated, including: 46 generals, 14,403 officers and 444,565 privates. 54,753 people died in captivity in the USSR for various reasons, including 3 generals, 1,566 officers and 53,184 non-commissioned officers and privates. The main causes of death were wounds and illnesses resulting from participation in hostilities; industrial injuries; diseases caused by unusual climate and poor living conditions; suicide; accidents.

The difference between the officially accepted number of Hungarian citizens captured by Soviet troops in 1941 -1945. (526,604 people), and our data on those held captive in the USSR (513,767 people) is 12,837 people. The fact is that 2,485 people were recognized as citizens of the USSR (and not 2,922, as determined on January 1, 1949), and the remaining 10,352 people were released from captivity in Budapest in April - May 1945 and were not taken to the territory of the USSR .

How did the Soviet state contain such a huge number of prisoners of war, how did it treat them?

The Soviet state expressed its attitude towards prisoners of war of the enemy army with the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in the Analysis of the content of the “Regulations on Prisoners of War”, shows that it complied with and took into account the basic requirements of international humanitarian law on the treatment of prisoners of war and the Geneva Convention on the Maintenance of Prisoners of War of July 27, 1929 of the year. The general and special sections of the “Regulations on Prisoners of War” were detailed, supplemented or clarified by decrees and decisions of the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, as well as orders and directives of the NKVD (MVD) of the USSR, UPVI (GUPVI) of the NKVD (MVD) of the USSR.

On the main fundamentally important issues of keeping prisoners of war, their material, food and medical support, the Soviet government made about 60 decisions from 1941 to 1955, which were communicated to officials and prisoners of war both directly and through the issuance of departmental regulations. Such acts were issued only by the UPVI (GUPVI) of the NKVD (MVD) of the USSR during this period, about three thousand.

For the sake of historical justice, it should be recognized that the actual practice of prisoner of war camps was not always adequate to the standards of humanity.

Due to various reasons (disorganization, negligence in the performance of official duties, war and post-war difficulties in the country, etc.), in some prisoner of war camps there were facts of poor organization of consumer services, cases of lack of food, etc. For example, during a scheduled inspection by the GUPVI NKVD commission of the USSR front-line prisoner of war camp No. 176 (Focsani, Romania, 2nd Ukrainian Front) in January 1945, which held 18,240 prisoners of war (of which 13,796 were Hungarian; officers - 138, non-commissioned officers - 3025, privates - 10,633 13, a number of shortcomings were identified: hot food was provided twice a day, food distribution was poorly organized (breakfast and lunch lasted 3-4 hours). and vegetables), sugar was not issued. At the same time, it was established that the orders received by the camp administration for potatoes, sugar and lard were not implemented until January 25, 1945. In other words, it was necessary to go to the food bases and get it. specified products, but the responsible officials did not do this in a timely manner. It should be emphasized that even after such a comprehensive check, the situation in the camp improved only slightly. This gave rise to the repatriated Hungarian anti-fascist prisoners of war, who were in transit home through camp No. 176, to write collectively in December 1945. a letter about the shortcomings they saw in the maintenance of prisoners of war addressed to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party M. Rakosi. And he, in turn, sent him personally to K.E. Voroshilov. The leadership of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs conducted an official investigation into this fact. The head of camp No. 176, Senior Lieutenant Puras, was punished.

In terms of food and medical supplies, Hungarian prisoners of war, like prisoners of war of other nationalities, were equal to military personnel of the rear units of the Red Army. In particular, according to the telegram of the General Staff of the Red Army No. 131 dated June 23, 1941 (and its content was duplicated by the telegram of the General Staff of the Red Army No. VEO-133 dated June 26, 1941 and the orientation of the UPVI NKVD of the USSR No. 25/6519 dated June 29, 1941 g.), the following food standards were established per prisoner of war per day (in grams): rye bread - 600, various cereals - 90, meat - 40, fish and herring - 120, potatoes and vegetables - 600, sugar - 20, etc. . d. (14 items in total) . In addition, those who voluntarily surrendered into captivity (defectors), in accordance with the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated November 24, 1942, were given a daily bread quota of 100 g more than the rest.

The Soviet government controlled the food supply of prisoners of war. During the period from June 1941 to April 1943, three decrees were issued concerning the nutrition of prisoners of war and measures to improve it: Decrees of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1782-790 of June 30, 1941 and No. 1874 - 874 of November 24, 1942; Resolution of the State Defense Committee of the USSR (GKO USSR) No. 3124 of April 5, 1943.

To improve the food supply for prisoners of war, stalls were organized at each camp (although due to wartime, they began to function only after 1944). For physically weakened prisoners of war, according to the order of the NKVD of the USSR dated October 18, 1944, new food standards were established (in particular, bread began to be issued at 750 g per day per person). The normal attitude of the Soviet state towards Hungarian prisoners of war is evidenced by numerous reviews written by them in their own hands, as well as photographic documents.

At the same time, it should be noted that in winter conditions, especially in the period from December 1942 to March 1943, the provision of food for military personnel during their evacuation from places of captivity to front-line camps (the distance to them was sometimes 200 - 300 km) was poorly organized. There were no sufficient nutritional points along the evacuation routes. Food was issued in dry rations for 2 - 3 days in advance. Weakened and hungry, surrounded by people, they immediately ate all the food they received. And this sometimes led not only to loss of strength, but also to death. Later, the noted shortcomings were eliminated.

The results of the study showed that Hungarian prisoners of war were generally hostile towards the Germans (German citizens) and wanted to actively fight with weapons in their hands against them.

Of the 60,998 Hungarian prisoners of war held in the camps of the NKVD of the USSR on December 20, 1944, about 30% asked the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR (through the administration of the camps) to enroll them in the Hungarian Volunteer Division. Taking into account mass wishes, on December 27, 1944, the head of the UPVI NKVD of the USSR, Lieutenant General I. Petrov, personally sent to L. Beria a draft resolution of the USSR State Defense Committee on the issue of organizing the Volunteer Hungarian Infantry Division from prisoners of war. The project was developed jointly with the General Staff of the Red Army. The formation of the division was planned to begin in Debrecen (Hungary): 25% from Hungarian prisoners of war held in rear camps, and 75% from the number of surrendered Hungarians who were in front-line camps (there were 23,892 people). It was planned to equip the division's personnel with captured weapons. Matthias Rákosi took a direct part in resolving this important political issue for Hungary. A total of 21,765 people were released from captivity and transferred to form Hungarian military units.

It should be noted that while staffing these military units with rank and file did not cause any difficulties, there was clearly a shortage of officers. This was due to the fact that the command staff from among the Hungarian prisoners of war was mostly negatively opposed to the Soviet state and its policies. Some, for example Majors Batond and Zvalinsky, in February 1945 agreed to be enlisted in the 6th Infantry Division of the Hungarian Army in Debrecen, as it turned out, with the aim of carrying out disintegration work among its personnel. They spread all sorts of rumors, such as: “the best people will be arrested by the GPU and sent to Siberia,” etc.

The repatriation of Hungarian prisoners of war was carried out systematically. Thus, according to the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1497 - 341 of June 26, 1945, 150,000 Hungarian prisoners of war were repatriated, and by order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2912 of March 24, 1947 - 82 Hungarian prisoners of war. According to his resolution No. 1521 - 402 of May 13, 1947 “On the repatriation of prisoners of war and interned Hungarians during May - September 1947,” it was planned to repatriate 90,000 people, but in fact 93,775 were repatriated; according to the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1039-393 of April 5, 1948, 54,966 Hungarian prisoners of war were repatriated, etc. Before repatriation, a full monetary settlement was made with each Hungarian prisoner of war: he received that part of the money earned in captivity in the USSR that remained after deductions for his maintenance. Each one left a receipt stating that the settlement with him had been made in full and he had no claims against the Soviet state.

The UPVI NKVD of the USSR in January 1945 was renamed the Main Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR for Prisoners of War and Internees (GUPVI NKVD of the USSR)

TsGA, f. 1p. op, 01e, no. 35. pp. 36-37.

Ibid., f. 1p. op 01e, d.46 pp. 212-215, 228-232, 235-236; op. 30th d., l.2

Suicides were committed mainly to avoid punishment for war crimes or due to nervous strain and weakness of spirit. Thus, on June 2, 1945, at 3:45 a.m., at army prisoner of war reception point No. 55 (Zwegl, Austria), Hungarian prisoner of war Colonel-General Hesleni József, former commander of the 3rd Army, committed suicide by opening the veins of his forearm with a piece of window glass. the Hungarian army, which fought on the side of the Germans. Regarding this suicide, the Hungarian prisoner of war, Lieutenant General Ibrani Michal, said: “Various rumors about the punishment of the perpetrators of the war, about the execution of Hungarian generals showed him the future was hopeless” (see TsGA, f. 451, item 3, d. 21, pp. 76-77).

TsGA, f. 4p. op. 6, d.4, pp. 5-7.

There f. 1p. op. 5a, d.2, ll. 294-295.

There f. op. 1a, no. 1 (collection of documents)

There f. 451p. op. 3, no. 22, no. 1-3.

There ll. 7-10.

There ll. 2-3.

There f. 1p. op. 01e, no. 46, l. 169-170.

Pappenheim was staring at it: already in the first months of the battles on the Eastern Front, the Hungarian ground units, which were used by the German command mainly to pursue the retreating troops of the Red Army, suffered significant losses. Only the Hungarian mobile corps, which included cavalry, motorized and tank formations, continued to participate in the battles. But parts of the so-called “Carpathian Corps”, which consisted of the 8th border and 1st mountain rifle brigades, were actively used by the Germans as occupation forces.
In the fall of 1941, the battered mobile corps was withdrawn from the front. The German command demanded that Hungary field a significant contingent of occupation troops as a replacement. To ensure occupation activities on the territory of the USSR, the political leadership of Hungary began to send rifle brigades that were stationed in two different regions. The 111th, 123rd and 124th brigades were stationed in Ukraine in the Poltava region, where it was relatively calm. But in the south of the Bryansk forests, where the 102nd, 105th and 108th infantry brigades were deployed, the picture was completely different - partisans were operating there.
The Hungarian units, as well as the SD (German: Sicherheitsdienst - security service) and GUF (German: Geheime Feldpolizei - secret field police) formations responsible for this territory, had to closely cooperate with each other - until the summer of 1942, each Hungarian division was assigned a GUF group consisting of 50-60 people was seconded. These police groups were divided into 6-8 groups and distributed among the Hungarian battalions. Their task was to interrogate local residents and captured partisans, as well as to carry out military court sentences. Therefore, when considering the atrocities of the Hungarian occupation forces on the territory of the USSR, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the Hungarian occupation forces all the time acted either together with the Germans or under German control. However, the Hungarians themselves were zealous beyond all measures in their punitive actions against the civilian population.

This was especially evident in the actions of the divisions that found themselves near the border of the RSFSR and Belarus. For example, a multi-week military operation to clear the Bryansk forests of partisans by the forces of the 102nd and 105th light divisions, which ended on May 30, 1942, ended, according to Hungarian data, with the following results: 4375 “partisans and their accomplices” were destroyed, 135 were captured prisoners, and only 449 rifles, as well as 90 machine guns and machine guns, were captured. From this we can draw a very definite conclusion - the vast majority of the liquidated “partisans” did not have any weapons.

The total losses of the “partisans” were almost nine times higher than the losses of the attackers, and from the indicated number of captured weapons it follows that at most 600-700 partisans could have died in the battles, the rest were civilians. Similar actions in 1941-1942. were carried out repeatedly. In total, the Hungarian occupation forces from November 1941 to August 1942, according to incomplete data, destroyed 25-30 thousand “partisans”, while it is obvious that the vast majority of them were civilians.
Over time, the Germans realized that the Hungarian methods in no way contributed to the real fight against the partisans. Evidence of this can be found, for example, in the report of Lieutenant Colonel Kruvel:

“Taking into account the enemy’s propaganda, their (Hungarian) indiscipline and absolutely arbitrary behavior towards the local population could only bring harm to German interests. Robbery, rape and other crimes were common. Additional hostility of the local population was obviously caused by the fact that the Hungarian troops could not defeat the enemy in combat.”

Beginning in 1943, the Hungarian occupation forces carried out fewer and fewer major actions against the partisans. One of their main tasks was to ensure the safety of the railway: for this, the Hungarian connections stretched over thousands of kilometers. Due to the vast territory, the protection of the railway could only be solved with the help of fortified outposts, located several hundred meters from each other, which kept under control a strip cleared of vegetation on both sides of the railway embankment. However, the Hungarians, of course, did not forget about punitive actions against civilians.

War crimes of the Hungarians
The Hungarian occupation units diligently sowed fear and horror on the occupied land. Here are just a few examples. Peasant woman of the Sevsky district of the Bryansk region V.F. Mazerkova:

“When they saw the men from our village, they said that they were partisans. And the same number, i.e. On May 20, 1942, they seized my husband Mazerkov Sidor Borisovich, born in 1862, and my son Mazerkov Alexei Sidorovich, born in 1927, and tortured them, and after this torture they tied their hands and threw them into a pit, then they lit the straw and burned them in a potato house. pit. On the same day, they not only burned my husband and son, they also burned 67 men.”

For some reason, the partisans captured by the Hungarians are very similar to ordinary people. 1942 - “No place for leniency...” | Military historical portal Warspot.ru
For some reason, the partisans captured by the Hungarians are very similar to ordinary people. 1942
Peasant woman from the same region, E. Vedeshina:

“It was in the month of May on the 28th day of 1942. I and almost all the residents went into the forest. These thugs also followed there. They are in our place, where we (inaudible) with our people, shot and tortured 350 people, including my children who were tortured: daughter Nina 11 years old, Tonya 8 years old, little son Vitya 1 year old and son Kolya 5 years old. I was left barely alive under the corpses of my children.”

Resident of the village of Karpilovka R.S. Troy:

“In our village of Karpilovka, only Hungarian units (Magyars) committed atrocities and atrocities, especially in the period May-August 1943 […] they ordered us to take shovels, gathered about 40 of us to the anti-tank ditch and ordered us to bury the anti-tank ditch with shot corpses. […] The ditch was approximately 30 meters long and 2 meters wide. The corpses lay in disarray, and it was difficult to establish traces of firearms, because it was a bloody mess of old men, old women and teenagers. It was a terrible picture, and I couldn’t look closely at where their wounds were and where they were shot.”

The Honvéds also did not stand on ceremony in their treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. For example, during the retreat in 1943 from the Chernyansky district of the Kursk region, Hungarian military units took with them from the local concentration camp 200 Red Army prisoners of war and 160 civilians. Along the way, they were all locked in the school building, doused with gasoline and set on fire. Those who tried to escape were shot.

​The caption to the original photo says that Hungarian soldiers are talking with an arrested Red Army soldier. Judging by his clothes, in fact he could be anyone - “There is no room for leniency...” | Military historical portal Warspot.ru
The caption to the original photo says that Hungarian soldiers are talking with an arrested Red Army soldier. Judging by his clothes, he could actually be anyone.
There are also memories of eyewitnesses. Former prisoner of war, military doctor of the 3rd rank Vasily Petrovich Mamchenko spoke about the regime in the Dulag-191 concentration camp, located in a brick factory:

“The prisoners were driven into sheds for drying bricks, where there were no windows or ceilings. They slept on bare ground. The sick and wounded were in the same conditions. There were no medications or dressings. The wounds of the patients festered, worms grew in them, gas gangrene developed, and there were often cases of tetanus. The camp regime was very cruel; prisoners worked 10-12 hours on earthworks. They were fed morning and evening gruel - warm water and flour, several spoons each. Occasionally, as a sop, they cooked rotten horse meat. The doctor of the Steinbach camp did not have the specialty of a surgeon, but he practiced operations on prisoners and killed many. When hungry soldiers on the way to work bent down to pick up a beet or potato dropped from a cart from the road, the Magyars escorts shot them on the spot.”

Military doctor 3rd rank Ivan Alekseevich Nochkin, who lived in captivity in this camp for six months, said that on September 17, 1942, when the prisoners of war were at work, the Nazis placed explosives in the stove of the barracks that housed 600 people. Returning from work in the evening, people lit the stove. A deafening explosion followed. Those who tried to run out through the doors were shot by the Hungarian guards. Corpses littered the entrance. The acrid smoke suffocated the people and they burned. 447 people died.

​The graves of Hungarian soldiers in the village of Polnikovo, Ukolovsky district, Voronezh region (now Krasnensky district, Belgorod region). Two soldiers were killed on July 21, 1942 in a nearby forest. By whom and how is unknown, probably by Red Army soldiers emerging from encirclement, but local residents were accused of involvement in this. At the end of the 90s of the last century, the remains of Hungarians were exhumed and reburied at the united Hungarian cemetery in the Voronezh region - “There is no place for leniency...” | Military historical portal Warspot.ru
Graves of Hungarian soldiers in the village of Polnikovo, Ukolovsky district, Voronezh region (now Krasnensky district, Belgorod region). Two soldiers were killed on July 21, 1942 in a nearby forest. By whom and how is unknown, probably by Red Army soldiers emerging from encirclement, but local residents were accused of involvement in this. At the end of the 90s of the last century, the remains of the Hungarians were exhumed and reburied at the united Hungarian cemetery in the Voronezh region
Resident of the city of Ostrogozhsk, Voronezh region, Maria Kaydannikova:

“The fire was burning brightly there. Two Magyars held the prisoner by the shoulders and legs and slowly roasted his stomach and legs over the fire. They either raised him above the fire, or lowered him lower, and when he died down, the Magyars threw his body face down on the fire. Suddenly the prisoner began to twitch again. Then one of the Magyars thrust a bayonet into his back with a flourish.”

German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels made a very remarkable assessment of the actions of the Hungarian troops against the Soviet population in his diary. Describing the situation in the Bryansk region in May 1942, he noted:

“To the south of this region, Hungarian formations are fighting. They need to occupy and pacify one village after another. When the Hungarians declare that they have pacified a particular village, this usually means that not a single inhabitant remains there. This, in turn, means for us that we will hardly be able to carry out any agricultural work in such an area.”
It was necessary to be able to make Goebbels regret the excessive sacrifices among the “Untermensch”. The Hungarians did it. It is not surprising that even in our time, elderly residents of the Kursk, Voronezh, and Belgorod regions, recalling the times of occupation, say that the Hungarians were worse than the Germans.



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